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Abstract 
 
Callicott’s interpretation of Leopold’s land ethic has been criticized as ecofascist and 
misanthropic. In addition, it has been argued that his principle precept upon which his 
land ethic rests is vague if not incoherent. In light of these challenges, I suggest a better 
way to arrive at a land ethic, which deals not with obligations or duties to the land as 
Callicott’s does but instead with the application of virtues to nature. In this paper, I 
provide a brief overview of Callicott’s land ethic and then include a few criticisms of the 
land ethic. Next, I argue for why a focus on the development of personal character using 
virtues makes a virtue ethic preferable to Callicott’s deontological approach in terms of 
its candidacy for an environmental ethic. Finally, I suggest four virtues—compassion, 
humility, wonder and prudence—that not only are vital in forming an environmental 
virtue ethic for the land, they are also able to help solve many problems associated with 
Callicott’s excessively holistic land ethic. For instance, the virtues of compassion and 
prudence are able to provide a moderately holistic land ethic that appropriately values the 
dynamic between the individual and the community. In addition, I argue that a land ethic 
built on virtues can correctly label the value of pain unlike Callicott’s version, which is 
inclined to overlook—and, at times, possibly endorse—pain.	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Environmental Virtue, Callicott and the Land Ethic 
	  
It	  is	  not	  so	  difficult	  to	  love	  nonhuman	  life,	  if	  gifted	  with	  knowledge	  about	  it.1	  
	  	  -­‐Edward	  O.	  Wilson	  
 
 
 For all his successes, Socrates was a self-described poor student when it came to 
environmental ethics. He tells Phaedrus, “I am devoted to learning; landscapes and trees 
have nothing to teach me—only the people in the city can do that” (Phaedrus 230d). This 
message, similar to many of his other teachings, stayed with philosophers for more than 
2,400 years. Ethics, since the time of Socrates, has been an interpersonal discipline 
concentrating on good and right action among people. Lately, however, a new breeze is 
blowing, and it is taking hearts and minds out into nature. This has fostered a new 
emphasis on the environment and has reconnected us, in certain ways, to the natural 
world.  
In the beginning of the 20th century, scientists such as Frederic L. Clements, Paul  
Sears, and Eugene P. Odum were voices influential in getting people interested in 
ecology and conservation. In 1949, an ecologist named Aldo Leopold wrote A Sand 
County Almanac, which featured a revolutionary essay called “The Land Ethic” that 
sought an all-encompassing respect for the land. In his dedication to environmental 
issues, Leopold was ahead of many philosophers. It wasn’t until three decades later that 
the philosophical community took notice of Leopold’s work when J. Baird Callicott 
embraced the all-inclusive message of the land ethic and brought it into the 
environmental ethics community.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Wilson,	  E.O.	  (2002).	  The	  Future	  of	  Life	  (p.	  134).	  New	  York:	  Knopf.	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 The land ethic recognizes three human environments—individuals, society and 
the land. The first two steps of ethical extension, Leopold claims, have been taken: The 
Golden Rule, for instance, integrates the individual to society. Land, however, is still 
merely property, and its relation to individuals, he suggests, is one of economic privilege 
but not obligation (1949, 203-204). Although there is no ethical system, as yet, that deals 
with man’s relationship to the land, Leopold insists that the “third step in a sequence”—
the land ethic—is an ecological necessity. 
 Following the vision of Leopold, Callicott’s interpretation of a far-reaching land 
ethic invigorated the debate among environmental philosophers about the role of 
humanity in nature. Ultimately, it sought to enlarge the boundaries of the ethical 
community “to include soils, waters, plants and animals, or collectively: the land” 
(Callicott, 1999, 230). In turn, the land ethic could restore focus to the overall biotic 
community. A land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-
community, Leopold says, to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his 
fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such (204).   
Callicott’s land ethic, however, has been criticized as excessively holistic, 
ecofascist and even misanthropic. In addition, it has been argued that his principle 
precept upon which his land ethic rests is vague if not incoherent. In light of these 
challenges, I suggest a better way to arrive at a land ethic, which deals not with 
obligations or duties to the land as Callicott’s does but instead with the application of 
virtues to nature. In this paper, I provide a brief overview of Callicott’s land ethic and 
then include a few criticisms of the land ethic. Next, I argue for why a focus on the 
development of personal character using virtues makes a virtue ethic preferable to 
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Callicott’s deontological approach in terms of its candidacy for an environmental ethic. 
Finally, I suggest four virtues—compassion, humility, wonder and prudence—that not 
only are vital in forming an environmental virtue ethic for the land, they are also able to 
help solve many problems associated with Callicott’s excessively holistic land ethic. For 
instance, the virtues of compassion and prudence are able to provide a moderately holistic 
land ethic that appropriately values the dynamic between the individual and the 
community. In addition, I argue that a land ethic built on virtues can correctly label the 
value of pain unlike Callicott’s version, which is inclined to overlook—and, at times, 
possibly endorse—pain. 
 
I. 
 The extension of ethics to the land, Leopold and Callicott claim, is a process of 
ecological evolution. They allude to Darwin’s account of evolution, which argues that 
even ethics can be understood as having evolved by natural selection from traits of 
closely related species. But ethics seems problematic from an evolutionary perspective 
(Callicott, 1999, 117). Ethics demands that moral agents selflessly consider other 
interests apart from their own, but evolution would seem to predict that the selfish would 
outcompete the selfless. Therefore, in the struggle for existence, selfish acts and an 
emphasis on selfishness would be selected for in a population. History, however, at least 
as it relates to remote human ancestors, suggests the opposite—that they were more 
callous and ruthless than we are. So how is it that altruism, which actually reduces 
personal fitness of individual organisms, possibly evolves from natural selection?  
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 Darwin suggests that life’s struggle for humans is more efficiently prosecuted 
collectively and cooperatively rather than singly and competitively (118). While solitary 
ancestors were easy prey to their enemies, together they stood a fighting chance of 
defending themselves and attacking animals larger than themselves. Given that they 
recognized strength in numbers, humans began to form primitive societies for protection. 
With these small groups came rudimentary ethics to enhance cohesion and integration. 
As Darwin says, “No tribe could hold together if murder, robbery and treachery were 
common; consequently such crimes within the limits of the same tribe ‘are branded with 
everlasting infamy’ but excite no such sentiment beyond these limits” (1871, 93). 
 With self-sacrifice first grounded in small groups, an evolutionary pathway to 
ethics begins, and these altruistic parental sentiments began to spill over to siblings and 
close kin. This allowed for larger groups to bond together, which enabled them to defend 
themselves and reproduce more efficiently. While the group dynamic was stronger, 
Callicott states, the social impulses and sentiments, by themselves, fell short of an ethic. 
They did serve as foundations of ethics, however, and moral rules took shape over time in 
virtue of Homo sapiens’ unique ability to use their intelligence and imagination to 
develop a rich language that could articulate commandments to prohibit destructive 
behavior. 
The logic of the land ethic, Callicott notes, is that natural selection has given 
humans the ability to have moral responses to bonds of kinship and community identity. 
And, he suggests, because ethics has its origin in modes of cooperation by interdependent 
individuals, then all ethics rests upon the idea that the individual takes membership in a 
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community of interdependent parts. Moreover, if the land today is represented as a biotic 
community, an environmental ethic is both possible and necessary (1999, 229-231). 
Ethics further developed as larger human social groups began to dominate smaller 
ones. This competition gave rise to different levels of organizations. Clans merged into 
tribes; tribes, then, into nations, and finally, nations into republics. Each changing level of 
society, Darwin suggests, saw an extension of systems of ethics. He explains:  
As man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger 
communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to 
extend his social instincts and sympathies to all the members of the same nation, 
though personally unknown to him. This point being once reached there is only an 
artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to the men of all nations and 
races (1871, 100-101). 
 
 Leopold, of course, sought to extend “social instincts and sympathies” even 
farther than Darwin’s universal human rights ethic. In addition to evolutionary theory, 
Leopold rests his land ethic on two other scientific principles. Taken together, the three 
foundations help connect the idea that the land must be viewed as a collective community 
of soils, waters, and natural flora and fauna. Once land is perceived in this manner—as a 
biotic community—Leopold suggests the land ethic will expectedly emerge.   
The first scientific principle on which the land ethic rests is evolutionary biology, 
and it establishes a diachronic link between ethics and social development. The second 
scientific principle is ecological, which provides a community concept that can be seen as 
uniting human and nonhuman nature. Last, the perspective of Copernican astronomy 
describes the Earth as a small planet in an immense and hostile universe, which 
contributes to a sense of kinship and community by demonstrating the importance of a 
shared setting in the universe.  
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The community focus of the land ethic, Callicott says, shifts the moral concern 
gradually away from individual members of nature to the biota collectively, and right and 
wrong, as a result, is governed by measuring the effects on community rather than on the 
individual. Thus, the land ethic, according to Callicott, is “holistic with a vengeance,” and 
he states it is this intensely holistic outlook that distinguishes it from any other ethic in 
modern moral philosophy (1999, 231). One other distinction is that, unlike the standard 
modern model of ethical theory that has traditionally been psychocentric and therefore 
radically individualistic, the land ethic provides for the moral consideration of wholes, 
such as endangered species, ecosystems or the totality of the biosphere. This emphasis on 
collectives, Callicott suggests, is seen clearly in Darwinian evolution, and Darwin himself 
sometimes wrote as if morality had no other object than the welfare of the community 
(232). Darwin writes: 
We have now seen that actions are regarded by savages, and were probably so 
regarded by primeval man, as good or bad, solely as they obviously affect the 
welfare of the tribe—not that of species nor that of  individual member of the 
tribe. This conclusion agrees well with the belief that the so-called moral sense is 
aboriginally derived from social instincts, for both relate at first exclusively to the 
community (1904, 120).    
 
For the land ethic, therefore, the biotic community should be awarded intrinsic 
value because, Callicott suggests, it is a newly discovered object of a specially evolved 
“public affection” that humans have inherited through evolution from their ancestral 
social primates. But the overriding holism of the land ethic, he states, is not found 
primarily through the evolutionary principle but instead through ecological thought. As 
the study of the relationships of organisms to one another and to the elemental 
environment, ecology binds the individuals into a seamless fabric. Ecological 
relationships determine the nature of organisms rather than the other way around. A 
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species is what it is, Callicott suggests, because of its adaptations to the ecosystem; the 
whole, quite literally, shapes its component parts (1999, 232). 
The reliance of all organisms on a land pyramid, Callicott notes, solidifies the  
ecological relation between the ecosystem and its species. Energy from the sun enters the 
biotic community through the leaves of plants and then finds its temporary home in 
herbivores, then on to omnivores and carnivores. In addition, solar energy is recycled 
back into the soil after it is broken down by worms, bacteria and other decomposers. The 
species that make up each layer are not necessarily alike other than what they eat, and 
each layer in the pyramid furnishes food to those above. Moreover, as one moves upward 
through the organizational structure, the number of species are drastically diminished so 
that for every apex carnivore, there exist hundreds of its prey, millions of insects, and 
countless more species of plantlife. Land, as Callicott explains, is more than soil. Rather, 
it acts a fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants and animals. Food 
chains are living channels conducting energy upward, and death and decay return energy 
to the soil (233). 
 As the land is conceived as a fountain of energy, Callicott argues, the holistic 
foundations of the land ethic are clear. Viewed from this model, process precedes 
substance, and energy is prior to matter. Individual plants and animals, therefore, do not 
stand on their own and are more like “ephemeral structures in a patterned flux of energy.” 
The land’s function as a type of energy unit, he asserts, emerges as the ultimate good of 
the land ethic (234).  
 From this good, the land ethic establishes several practical principles. Among its 
top priorities is the preservation of species, especially those at the top of the pyramid. 
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Many human activities, such as deforestation, result in massive species extinctions and 
are devolutionary as they diminish the biotic pyramid. While evolutionary changes are 
normally gradual, humanity’s development of technology has enabled for rapid and 
unprecedented changes, both Leopold and Callicott assert, within the biotic community. 
While we have inherited more diversity than had ever existed before on Earth, Callicott 
says, the rate at which human-caused species extinction is occurring is unacceptable, 
according to the land ethic, as it results in biological impoverishment instead of 
enrichment (234).  
Callicott lays the philosophical foundations for the land ethic in “Animal 
Liberation: A Triangular Affair,” in which he draws a distinction between environmental 
ethics and the animal liberation movement. Although both provide, he says, for a 
historical progression of moral rights from fewer to greater entities, environmental ethics 
(i.e., the land ethic) is a more sweeping, more inclusive extension than the one animal 
liberationists envision (1992, 38). To advocates of Callicott’s and Leopold’s land ethic, 
the beech and chestnut have as much a right to life as the wolf and the deer, and 
mountains and streams are genuine ethical concerns as serious as the concerns of animals. 
In short, Callicott asserts that the land ethic and the ethic of the animal liberation 
movement are different ethical systems as they rest upon dissimilar theoretical 
foundations. 
 The emergence of the land ethic, Callicott suggests, adds another element to a 
controversy assumed to be only between so-called ethical humanists and humane 
moralists. Whereas ethical humanists hold that only humans can be granted moral 
considerability on the grounds that they are rational, or are capable of having interests or 
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possess self-awareness, humane moralists expand the requirement to the capability of 
feeling pleasure and pain, or sentience, to enjoy full moral standing. Animals that suffer, 
even though they are deprived of reason and speech, should be as much a matter of 
ethical concern as humans, say sentientists. Why, they argue, should moral 
considerability be provided only to those who use reason or speech? After all, what does 
the ability to reason have to do with moral standing? Such a criterion, sentientists argue, 
seems unrelated to bestowing this type of value. The capacity to suffer, on the other hand, 
seems to be a more relevant criterion. To suffer pain is evil while its opposite, pleasure, is 
good. The hedonic utilitarianism of the humane moralists, therefore, insists that we 
maximize pleasure and minimize pain.  
 Like the humane moralists, ethical humanists draw a well-defined and sharp 
cutoff point that splits those who are granted moral standing from those who are not. 
While the dividing line for the latter is drawn between those who are rational and those 
who are not, the former affords moral status only to beings capable of feeling pain. The 
land ethic, Callicott says, suggests that the community is the ultimate measure of moral 
value. Callicott gets his principle precept of the land ethic from a statement made years 
earlier by Leopold: A thing is right “when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and 
beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (1949, 224-225). 
 The conceptual foundation of the land ethic, Callicott argues, differs significantly 
from that of the humane moralists. Whereas humane moralists measure the overall good 
within hedonistic utilitarianism on an individual basis—as a collection of separate 
entities—the context of the land ethic is ecological and, therefore, relational (1992, 45). 
As ecology focuses on relationships between nature and its organisms, it portrays a 
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holistic and connected environment rather than one made of distinct individuals 
independently pursuing its own interests. The land, viewed from an ecological 
perspective, can be seen as a unified system of integrally related parts.  
A humane moralist admits that pain must be minimized but that this evil is to be  
valued equally and independently of its victim. In other words, pain is pain no matter 
which sentient being—human or nonhuman animal—it inflicts; one agent should not 
consider her pleasure or pain to be of greater consequence in deciding on courses of 
action than any other. But the holistic land ethic assigns a relative moral worth, Callicott 
states, to all members of the biotic community in accordance with how they relate to the 
land (51). The community as a whole, in other words, serves as a standard for assessing 
value of its parts.   
 From the standpoint of ecological biology, Callicott adds, pain and pleasure are 
unrelated to good and evil (55). Pain is simply an instrument relaying information to an 
organism’s central nervous system of stress or irritation. Viewed this way, pain is not evil 
at all; in fact, Callicott says it actually can be desirable. For instance, the severity of pain 
from an injury informs someone the amount of further stress the body can endure while 
attempting to find safety, and this experience is highly valuable, Callicott suggests (55). 
Pleasure, on the other hand, is viewed as a reward accompanying actions that contribute 
to maintenance, such as eating or drinking, or the continuation of the species, such as 
sexual activity and serving a role as parents. Callicott suggests that freedom from pain as 
the ultimate good is biologically preposterous:  
To live is to be anxious about life, to feel pain and pleasure in a fitting mixture, 
and sooner or later to die. That is the way the system works. If nature as a whole 
is good, then pain and death are also good… The hidden agenda of the humane 
ethic is the imposition of the anti-natural prophylactic ethos of comfort and soft 
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pleasure on an even wider scale. The land ethic, on the other hand, requires a 
shrinkage, if at all possible, of the domestic sphere; it rejoices in a recrudescence 
of wilderness and a renaissance of tribal cultural experience (55-57).   
 
 
 
II. 
 
The land ethic’s bold pronouncements of its extreme holistic doctrine and the 
goodness of pain were not without its challengers. First, it was noted that the principle 
precept—a thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the 
biotic community—conspicuously fails to mention individuals. Callicott’s way of valuing 
individuals within natural communities differs greatly from what many other ethicists 
advocate, especially those in the animal welfare and animal rights movements. If, as 
Leopold and Callicott both say, individual humans are truly plain members of the biotic 
community and our large population threatens this community, many ethicists have asked 
if this means that we should act to dramatically reduce our own population. If we should, 
can’t we immediately take such measures the same way we might take care of members 
of plant or animal populations? According to the logic of the land ethic, opponents say, 
we can engineer human populations until we find an optimized community.  
This requirement that individual organisms of any kind—especially human 
organisms—be sacrificed for the good of the whole makes the land ethic, according to 
Tom Regan, a type of environmental fascism (1983, 262). From this point of view, it 
would be our duty to cause massive human fatalities to correct for the strain we have 
unyieldingly placed on nature. Indeed, it would be morally good to exterminate large 
portions of the population, and to refrain from this would be wrong, cry opponents of the 
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land ethic. What’s more, human society itself would fracture under the land ethic while 
leading to classical fascism, submergence of certain individuals and the resulting 
elevation of races and nations.  
 Aside from the problem of Callicott’s extreme holism and its possible offshoots, 
such as ecofascism, a growing movement in ecology was beginning to question the 
validity of the foundational principle on which the land ethic stood. As early as the 
1930s, years before “The Land Ethic” was published, scientists began to urge citizens to 
take ecology seriously. Botanist Paul Sears recommended that the government hire 
ecologists at the county level to attempt to educate the public with the goal of ending 
environmental deterioration. In Sears’ day, ecology was hailed as a guide to the future 
and was believed to offer a path to a kind of moral enlightenment, Donald Worster 
suggests, motivated by and ethic of conservation (1999, 248). In addition to Sears, 
ecologist Frederic L. Clements helped portray that ecology was a study of equilibrium, 
harmony and order. Nature, asserted Clements, is not characterized by an aimless 
wandering but a steady flow toward stability that can be directly measured by science. 
His characterization of the landscape was that it must reach a final stage, sometimes 
referred to as climax theory, called a “superorganism” that implied a group of plants had 
in essence become one—the integration of parts of a single animal rather than a mere 
collection of individuals. Later, in the 1950s and 1960s, scientists, such as Eugene P. 
Odum, began to speak of nature in different terms, using terms like “ecosystems” and 
energy flows.” All of Earth, Odum suggests, is laid out in interlocking sets of ecosystems 
of various sizes, and all of them have their own game plans that provide nature a 
direction. Every ecosystem, Odum argues in agreement with Clements, is moving toward 
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a goal assuming it hasn’t already reached it. For both Odum and Clements, nature’s end 
state is a blissful state of order.  
 The idea of the ordered ecosystem was a key component of environmentalists and 
ecologists even until the 1970s, Worster points out that a drastic change soon swept over 
ecology and shifted the science away from notions of harmony and toward what he 
describes as an ecology of chaos. Talk of predictable ecosystems on the road to 
equilibrium drastically switched to disturbance, disharmony and chaos. This meant that 
ecological succession, contrary to the teachings of Clements and Odum, actually does not 
lead anywhere. In other words, change in ecosystems has no direction nor do they ever 
reach any stability. Moreover, no progressive development is to be found in nature, which 
instead is characterized by growth of many individual species but with no trace of any 
emergent collectivity among them, including no movement toward a greater cohesiveness 
among natural flora and fauna. In short, very little if any of what Clements and Odum had 
suggested seemed to hold true for the study of ecosystems.  
 If the new ecological movement was to be believed, then stability and integrity of 
communities, such as ecosystems, are vague and fuzzy notions. This idea casts doubt on 
the entire working principle of the land ethic—if integrity and stability do not clearly 
refer to anything, then how can the land ethic prescribe right and wrong. If it can’t guide 
action, then it is difficult to see how it can be any type of responsible ethic. 
To some philosophers, however, it is not of primary importance that Callicott’s  
land ethic is intensely holistic, nor do they criticize that it lacks clear principles. They 
reject the land ethic for another reason: it isn’t extremely holistic, they say; in fact, to 
them the land ethic isn’t holistic at all. Cahen, for example, suggests ecosystems, i.e., 
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holistic entities, do not have interests of their own and, therefore, should not be granted 
moral considerability. While plants have interests, Cahen argues, because they are goal-
directed as they strive to heal themselves, an ecosystem has no well-being and is 
incapable of being harmed or benefited (1988, 196). In addition, what might appear to be 
a goal of an ecosystem, such as stability, is actually a behavioral byproduct of merely 
individual activities aimed at individualistic goals. The tendency of an ecosystem to 
bounce back after a disturbance, for example, is based on responses by individual 
organisms rather than by the entire ecosystem itself. So, stability is not a goal of the 
system, Cahen suggests, but is rather a goal of the individual. A system is goal-directed, 
he suggests, only if it behaves as it does because such behavior will bring about a 
particular goal.  
 In the remainder of this section, I would like to take a closer look at what I believe 
to be the three main problems associated with Callicott’s land ethic—namely, first, that it 
improperly values pain by discounting harmful experiences in organisms ; second, that 
the land ethic is overly and radically holistic and thus undervalues the individual; and 
third, that its principle precept incorrectly attributes teleological elements to the biotic 
community, such as stability and beauty, and these erroneous descriptions to 
communities complicate—if not completely upend—the ability of his land ethic to serve 
as any type of ethic at all. 
 To distance the land ethic from the humane moralist movement, Callicott 
describes how pain is viewed from each perspective. The differences are great, he says, in 
that sentientists see pain as evil and the capacity to suffer as the relevant criterion for 
moral standing. On the other hand, from the standpoint of the land ethic, pain is not evil 
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and sometimes might even be desirable. Callicott, for example, sees nothing wrong with 
pain as he says it is a “marvelous method” of conveying certain messages to organisms 
(1992, 68, footnote). Pain, on account of the land ethic, is identified as a sort of 
information that is particularly valuable. In situations where it occurs, Callicott asserts, it 
is far better for pain to be felt by an agent instead of being anesthetized (55). The 
implication is that any scenario in which pain is fully removed would also terminate any 
sort of beneficial information that pain relays to an individual.  
Although Callicott might be correct in describing pain as a great method of 
conveying information to individuals, must pain necessarily convey a message that is 
useful to the organism? It appears that Callicott believes it must, and this unvarying link, 
he argues, between pain and its transmission of worthwhile information can be 
considered a good for organisms. But I think Callicott overlooks that, although pain is 
necessarily experienced by all, this does not mean that the transfer of information is 
always useful. Pain, in other words, could be delivered to an agent without any sort of 
beneficial or useful message, and it is difficult to see how this type of pain would be 
considered anything other than negative. For instance, an acute pain overwhelming an 
individual—such as chronic, intractable pain or the pain associated with terminal 
cancer—is a grave feeling to which she cannot respond. Helplessness in the face of this 
pain transforms it into an evil—it is a troubling experience that, with no beneficial 
message, can do nothing but cause lasting suffering. There are pains that we have no cure 
for; consequently, we have no way to adapt to them, and they exist, for this reason, as 
evils.  
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Pain itself, however, admits of neither good nor evil. A response to pain can be 
highly valuable in that it helps individuals or species to adapt, evolve and survive. Either 
they learn and adapt to such experiences, or they fail to adapt, in which case they always 
are open to danger or the agony of sorrow. What organisms learn from dangerous 
situations, i.e., the tendency for pain to be viewed as a benefit or a harm, depends on the 
ability to adapt to the situation. Callicott’s land ethic inappropriately evaluates pain by 
viewing it as always permissible. On this account, pain always leads to an adaptation. 
This incorrectly assumes, I argue, that we always learn from painful experiences. 
Unfortunately, this is far from the case. Many illness and diseases create suffering that 
leaves us helpless. The evil of these pains are overlooked by Callicott’s land ethic. That 
Callicott’s land ethic misses the mark on the true nature of pain has dire consequences. 
Indeed, any ethical system that misdiagnoses the value of pain—in this case, supporting 
an exceedingly optimistic view of suffering—is one that is unable to consistently offer 
reliable action guidance.  
Callicott suggests that to feel pain and pleasure in a fitting mixture and eventually 
to die is the law of the land in nature. Moreover, he adds that if nature as a whole is good, 
then pain and death are also good (56). It is unclear what he means by the term “good”—
for instance, it is not clear if he is attributing moral goodness to nature. If so, then it 
seems he might be guilty of a fallacious appeal to nature: That something is natural does 
not necessarily make it good. On the other hand, if he is simply describing nature as 
beautiful, soothing or some other non-moral desirable property, talk of pain as “good” 
can be challenged, as it was above.  
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Describing pain as good and coupling this belief with extreme holism that stems 
from elevating the good of the community over that of the individual has led some to 
suggest the land ethic could overlook violence not just to organisms, in general, but 
specifically to human organisms. Callicott’s extreme holism, they say, comes directly 
from the land ethic’s principle precept—a thing is right when it tends to preserve the 
integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community and wrong when it tends 
otherwise. As humans significantly damage the biotic community by way of creating 
climate change or introducing air and water pollution, the harm we cause can only be 
rectified by drastically reducing our own population. While a call of decreasing 
population might appeal to many types of ethicists, one problem with the land ethic is 
that it does not address the manner in which this population should be reduced. In 
addition, by elevating the community above the individual, the land ethic deprives all 
individuals of value while suggesting that their value is calculated only insofar as they 
take care of the biotic community. In the next section, I suggest an alternate way of 
valuing individuals and the biotic community, which is able to properly locate the 
individual person within his community.  
One final significant problem with Callicott’s interpretation of the land ethic, I 
believe, is that its strength is harshly undercut because the principle precept is altogether 
unclear. For instance, two of its key terms that are responsible for guiding actions—
stability and beauty—admit of ambiguity and uncertainty. What, for example, is beauty 
in a biotic community? A forest, for instance, might be a beautiful landscape; a field of 
flowers swaying in the breeze also might be a vision of beauty. But the notion of beauty, 
I argue, is too subjective to be included as an action-guiding term in a supposedly 
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objective environmental ethic. Where one person might find beauty, for example, another 
might find repulsiveness. Callicott appears to take too simplistic a view of what beauty is; 
he assumes it to come only in one flavor, but beauty, e.g., something that leads to a state 
of happiness, comes in many kinds and is appreciated differently by different people. 
Because beauty is interpersonally a subjective term that is often disagreed upon, any land 
ethic basing action on beauty is doomed to provide subjectivity in how it directs action. 
 As beauty is ambiguous in the land ethic, so too is stability. Callicott, however, 
assumes that there exists only one type of stability. In this way, following Clements and 
Odum, the principle precept suggests that nature is relatively constant in the face of 
change and is always able to repair itself to the previous balanced state. It appears, 
however, that the notion of stability within ecosystems is not straightforward and actually 
varies with time. O’Neill explains that the concept of stability depends directly of the 
scale of observation. Frequent small-scale disturbances occurring in an ecosystem, for 
instance, can be overcome, and as a result this sort of ecosystem would be stable to these 
disturbances. Ultimately, though, ecosystems are unstable, O’Neill states: It is only a 
matter of time until a large enough disturbance overwhelms the ecosystem’s ability to 
respond (2001, 3278). O’Neill’s suggestion that an ecosystem’s lack of natural stability 
implies that it would not be wise to seek action-guidance from Callicott’s land ethic, 
which states without warrant that communities are stable.  
 Several problems have been identified in Callicott’s land ethic, many of which 
can be avoided if we steer away from his monistic deontological theory. I argue in the 
upcoming section against a land ethic based on deontology and suggest that a virtue-
based ethic is a natural approach that we can use to turn our focus toward the land. 
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III. 
For Callicott, the land ethic expresses a duty to the biotic community, but I 
suggest the land ethic can be better established using virtue. First, an environmental 
virtue approach should avoid problems of excessive holism (a symptom of which might 
be ecofascism), considering that virtues of compassion, respect and cooperation should 
be able to appropriately recognize and cherish both the individual and the community in 
which it operates. Second, unlike Callicott’s deontological land ethic, a virtue land 
ethic—with its dependence on many virtues—contains flexibility to account for how we 
value the land in various ways. But the jump from a duty-based ethic to one involving 
virtues might seem like somewhat of a random leap. Why attempt it? In other words, 
what is it about virtue ethics that might set it apart from deontology when it comes to 
representing the environment?  
First, what are some of the key differences between virtue ethics compared to 
deontology? For starters, virtue ethics emphasizes the agent more than the action. It 
answers the question “What should I do?” and also “What sort of person should I be?” As 
such, it focuses on character more than rules (as in deontology) or the consequences of 
actions (as in consequentialist theories, such as utilitarianism). Just as the virtue of a knife 
is to be sharp, a virtuous person, according to Aristotle, has character traits that become 
customary through practice over time. More specifically, he defines virtue to be a state of 
character that not only is concerned with choice but also lies in a mean relative to us that 
is between a deficiency or excess of a particular trait (Nicomachean Ethics II.6.1106b35-
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1107a2). Others have suggested that a virtue is a characteristic trait a human needs to 
flourish (Hursthouse 1999).  
Celia Deane-Drummond, a theologian who has developed a Christian virtue ethics 
approach to ecology, suggests that unlike other approaches, virtue ethics asks us to 
consider not just the action but the agent himself. Rather than focusing on which types of 
action we should perform, it emphasizes what sort of person we are. She continues: 
Actions, where they are considered, are in the light of who we are as persons, 
rather than detached from human character. The basic premise of virtue ethics is 
that goodness is a fundamental consideration, rather than rights, duties or 
obligations. Furthermore, virtue ethicists also reject the idea that ethical conduct 
can be codified in particular rules (2004, 6). 
 
Virtue’s insistence on flourishing implies that it stresses actions not from a  
temporary perspective but more from a long-term viewpoint. In other words, the virtuous 
person builds character not to meet the chaotic demands of any given day, rather he does 
so in order to live a balanced, well-rounded life and to achieve a state of happiness.  
Knowledge of how the world works is essential for virtue, and it is also essential 
for making good decisions about the environment. Simply knowing about a virtue, 
Aristotle says, does not make an agent virtuous. In addition, he or she must know how to 
apply the virtues appropriately, including doing so at the right time, in the right way, to 
the right person and for the right reason (Nicomachean Ethics II.6.1106b21-1106b23).  
Unlike duty in Callicott’s land ethic, which is disconnected from the agent, a 
virtue is within that agent and composes his character. Adopting virtues, including 
truthfulness, tolerance, righteousness, patience and loyalty, informs action and enriches 
character. Virtue, as Hursthouse says, is much more than a tendency to go in for certain 
sorts of actions (say, honest ones). Those who are honest perform the honest actions for 
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certain reasons, not, for example, merely because they follow a rule suggesting honesty is 
the best policy (2007, 160). Virtues, unlike a set of rules, are not given to us. Nor are they 
quick and easy to acquire, as Aristotle suggests in Nicomachean Ethics:  
A sign of what has been said about the unclarity of what intelligence requires is 
the fact that whereas young people become accomplished in geometry and 
mathematics and wise within these limits, intelligent young people do not seem to 
be found. The reason is that intelligence is concerned with particulars as well as 
universals, and particulars become known from experience, but a young person 
lacks experience, since some length of time is needed to produce it (1142a12-16). 
 
What is suggested by Aristotle, I believe, is that virtue is (with perhaps the  
exception of a few other advanced animals) distinctly human. I argue that it, more fully 
and completely than deontology and consequentialism, is able to incorporate and reflect 
the delicate and complex processes unique to humanity: deliberation, critical thinking and 
character development. If we value what it means to be human, if we value the possibility 
of advancement and intellectual progress, then we should take seriously an ethic based on 
acquisition and development of virtue.  
Virtue ethics differs from deontology in that it relies on more than a basic set of 
rules or principles to guide action. Many opponents of virtue ethics suggest, however that 
because it employs a long list of traits that aim to build character, it is unable to provide 
action-guidance. They claim that virtue does not allow, for instance, for the structure 
found in deontology and is therefore a weak moral theory because it fails to offer clear 
guidance. With virtues, there are no principles for guidance, the objection goes, and 
therefore there is no assistance with how we are supposed to act.  
One response to this criticism from advocates of virtue ethics is to stress the role 
of the virtuous agent as an exemplar. For example, I follow the lead of a virtuous person I 
admire and use his or her actions as a blueprint for my own behavior. If I find myself in 
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times of confusion, I seek advice from those I admire. Such advice is not only helpful to 
me in a given situation, it is helpful for my long-term moral development and my 
ongoing education on the road to moral maturity. Perhaps a more instructive model to 
guide virtuous action, however, is through the application of virtue rules. In contrast to 
deontological rules, the so-called v-rules are oriented around the virtues: Be just; be fair; 
be considerate, etc. These are not duties, per se; rather they are instructions to do as the 
virtuous agent would do. Athanassoulis explains in more detail about action-guidance as 
they relate to virtue: 
Knowing what to do is not a matter of internalizing a principle, but a life-long 
process of moral learning that will only provide clear answers when one reaches 
moral maturity. [Virtue ethics] can be action-guiding if we understand the role of 
the virtuous agent and the importance of moral education and development. If 
virtue consists of the right reason and the right desire, virtue ethics will be action-
guiding when we can perceive the right reason and have successfully habituated 
our desires to affirm its commands (Athanassoulis 2004). 
 
Some have suggested that virtue ethics and its dedication to personal character is 
precisely what the environment needs in order to improve. In what follows, I discuss how 
virtue can help develop a land ethic, and I point out four virtues that I believe are vital in 
establishing a respectful attitude toward the land. In addition, I suggest how these virtues 
are able to avoid the aforementioned problems of Callicott’s interpretation of the land 
ethic, including its discounting of pain to individuals and the problem of ecofascism. 
Developing virtue in ourselves, Damien Keown argues, is a starting point for 
resolving environmental issues (2007, 18). A focus on our own human nature, on 
establishing order first in our own house, is likely needed before we can have success in 
fixing the rest of the planet: 
Since humans are allegedly the culprits of many ecological problems such as 
climate change, water pollution, deforestation, desertification, and the general 
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mismanagement of resources, the solution would appear to lie in a reform of 
human attitudes rather than in what are often romanticized philosophies of nature 
which have little proven value in delivering practical results… Virtue ethics 
places human beings at the center of the ecological drama, but it does not follow 
from this that it maintains that only the interests of human beings need to be 
considered. Virtue ethics is certainly capable of affirming the value of nature 
while recognizing that it is other than human (18-19).   
 
Keown suggests that our environmental problems could stem from unhealthy  
attitudinal states, such as anger and indifference. To fix these glitches, Keown suggests 
we need to alter the way we think and the way we feel about our world. Such problems, 
he suggests, are caused by a dysfunctional state of mind, and he believes that virtues are 
ideal for constructing an environmental ethic because they are geared specifically to ease 
these troubling mental states (9). But virtue ethics places a fundamental emphasis on the 
power of emotion, and it is this complex but delicate collaboration between emotions on 
one side and reason on the other that allows for virtue ethics to address the challenges of 
understanding how to value the environment. The emotions, Corcoran suggests, have 
generally been understood in moral discourse as a ‘problem’ rather than an enabling 
feature of a good life (2004, 2). But many virtues are emotions, including benevolence, 
courage and ambition, and some, as I will argue below, are practically essential for 
developing a land ethic that pays the appropriate respect to nature. 
First, compassion is an integral part of experiencing a good life. This involves an 
aspect of awareness that can sympathize with the plight of others. Callicott, it would 
appear, omits compassion from his land ethic, which could lead to the charge of 
ecofascism and the corresponding suppression of the individual. A compassionate 
individual displays concern and sympathy for others. Callicott’s ethic, on the other hand, 
falls short of sympathy as it suggests that we turn our backs on wounded individuals and 
Simpson	  
	  
26	  
	  
that we ignore those in need of help. This lack of compassion for other follows directly 
from how he improperly values pain. But these actions of indifference suggested by 
Callicott are not what a land ethic should advise. To respect the land means that we must 
be compassionate with and attempt to relieve the land and its constituents of suffering.  
If we truly seek a land ethic built on virtues, we cannot get even to a life-centered 
ethic if we cannot be compassionate with other animals in the environment. A land ethic 
based in compassion involves broadening horizons past the sphere of interpersonal 
affairs. Among the first western philosophers to take a big step of compassion toward 
animals was Singer, who as a sentientist, extended moral considerability to animals 
capable of feeling pain. This was, of course, a noble step in the right direction toward 
caring for animals, but as Goodpaster notes, Singer’s efforts did not go far enough in 
terms of valuing individual organisms: 
Singer seems to think that beyond sentience ‘there is nothing to take into 
account.’ … Yet it is so clear that there is something to take into account, 
something that is not merely “potential sentience” and which surely does qualify 
beings as beneficiaries and capable of harm—namely, life (Goodpaster, 1978, 
316). 
 
Goodpaster suggests that capability of suffering is nothing more than an  
evolutionary adaptation that allows for living organisms to protect themselves from harm, 
and so sentience, he argues, is irrelevant to the argument regarding moral considerability. 
Nor does suffering, as Goodpaster suggests, simply involve physical measures of 
pleasure and pain. A tree feels no pain, but there are nonetheless ways that actions can 
harm it if by no other way than by thwarting its interests to survive (319). Rolston 
suggests although nothing matters to a tree, much is vital to it, and we should find the 
compassion necessary to respect it as such. Furthermore, he says, all organisms have ends 
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as they are “spontaneous, self-maintaining systems, sustaining and reproducing 
themselves and executing their programs” (1988, 109).  
Finally, consider the case of the Sumatran rhino. The smallest of all the living 
rhinoceroses, the Sumatran rhino lives on the island of Sumatra in western Indonesia. 
Poaching, primarily to obtain pieces of their horns, has slashed their population by more 
than 70 percent in the past 20 years. The horn is valued in parts of the world not only as 
an ornamental dagger handle but it is also frequently used in medicine in China, Taiwan, 
Hong Kong and Singapore. Made of keratin—the same type of protein that makes up hair 
and fingernails--one kilogram of this rhinoceros horn sells for $25,000. Not only are they 
killed for keratin, deforestation is taking a significant toll on the rhino’s habitat. It has 
been estimated as much land as five football fields each minute is disappearing due to 
development in Indonesia. As a result, due to extreme human interference, only about 
200 Sumatran rhinos exist now. While the principle precept of Callicott’s land ethic states 
that we should ignore the individual members of Sumatran rhino species, Callicott 
himself has said that “among our cardinal duties is the duty to preserve what species we 
can” (1999, 234), suggesting that Callicott is at odds with his own environmental ethic. It 
seems difficult to protect a species composed of individuals if we choose to emphasize 
only the whole while ignoring its parts. We must instead value individual members plus 
the species to which they belong—Callicott’s land ethic overlooks the individual while 
clearly favoring the community, but a sensible ethic values both community and its 
members. 
With so few Sumatran rhinos clinging to existence now, any disturbance to their 
environment is a grave danger not just to individual members of the species but to the 
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species itself. If we are compassionate to all animals, it naturally extends that we should 
be compassionate to the places in which they dwell. Spiders need their webs just like 
birds need the forest. The Sumatran rhino is losing precious ground to habitat destruction, 
and many species are being driven to extinction because of mining, logging or general 
urbanization. Compassion alone cannot save the animals and their habitat, but it can 
create an awareness many animals are indeed worth saving. It might be true that we 
cannot directly impact the situation in which the Sumatran rhino finds herself, but there 
are opportunities we can take closer to home to ensure that we minimize suffering of life.  
The virtue of humility, I believe, if acquired makes the acquisition of some other 
important virtues more easily attainable. Humility, put simply, is an attitude of modesty. 
The humble person does not see himself as superior to or worse than anyone or anything 
else. He is free from self-centeredness, and so is better situated to understand the distress 
of others. As with compassion, it, too, can be applied not only to humanity but also to the 
environment. Humility is a state of mind that allows no room for pride. A quick story 
might reveal how and why I believe this virtue to be so important in developing an 
environmentally friendly disposition. Not long ago, I visited a friend one night 
unannounced and was surprised to find him eating a very simple meal. I did not expect 
this, however, as I thought him to be a gourmand. I asked him why he chose to eat a 
modest meal at home rather than a fancy meal at an upscale restaurant. He agreed that he 
could eat at such places each night, but he said that just because he could did not mean 
that he would. What it sounds like my friend is saying is that just because we have the 
ability or power to do certain things is not reason enough for us always actually to 
perform these actions. I believe taking this idea to heart is one of the foundational 
Simpson	  
	  
29	  
	  
components of humility. A bit of humility is visibly absent in Callicott’s land ethic, as it 
promotes the community’s interests over the individual’s interests. An ethical theory 
based in humility, on the other hand, would do its best to balance the needs of the 
individual with the needs of the community. In short, an environmental virtue ethic 
would understand that the community cannot be placed above the individual because both 
play powerful roles in the ordinary functioning of the other. 
If applied to the environment, humility would suggest that humans should 
recognize the power they wield over the rest of the animals and all of nature. But it would 
require the knowledge that this power can be spent in multiple ways: it can be used to 
harm the natural world, or it can be used to improve upon it. An arrogant person would 
likely choose himself over nature, not realizing that humans actually have an important 
place within nature rather than existing apart from it. Those who view the land as a 
commodity rather than a community are more likely to misuse and abuse it. The virtue of 
humility, however, allows for respect of the land and could help foster a sense of 
community within it.  
 Both compassion and humility could open the door to the virtue of wonder 
regarding the immense beauty and the spectacular complexity of the environment. A 
sense of wonder, in addition, could connect us to where we stand in the world in relation 
to other animals. On one hand, we possess unique powers of deliberation. With our 
technology, for instance, we can explore the heavens and hypothesize about the 
beginning of our universe. We have creative and imaginative abilities that have eluded 
millions upon millions of species before us and all others that are among us today. In 
addition, we can exercise immense power over nature in the blink of an eye, and, unlike 
Simpson	  
	  
30	  
	  
any other animal, we can uniquely contemplate our place in nature and reflect on the 
ways we alter it. In many ways, we are alone on a pedestal looking down at the rest of the 
natural world. On the other hand, there are many ways that we are not alone in nature. 
Indeed, humans have evolved a powerful gift of critical thought. Surely, this makes us 
different from other animals, but we might be remiss to suggest it sets us apart from or 
above them. Contrary to what some believe, Homo sapiens is not the only species that 
has some type of awe-inspiring capability. In fact, all species are worthy of a certain 
amount of wonder as they all are unique, and, in addition, we could learn important 
things from many of them. A little curiosity and wonder can open our minds to 
remarkable things. For instance, the shark is a master at finding prey by detecting electric 
fields generated by their movement; the owl, thanks to some velvety feathers that acts as 
a muffler of sorts, hunts for prey without making a single sound; a large oak tree, to keep 
the water cycle afloat, can transpire up to 40,000 gallons of water per year. Dung beetles 
efficiently proceed thanklessly about their often neglected but important environmental 
work by using the Milky Way as a navigation aid.  
These are but a few modest examples of the spectacularly evolved abilities of 
everyday flora and fauna that we routinely undervalue, overlook or altogether ignore. 
When compared to most animals, humans have very little history to their name. As 
evolved as our minds are, we are more like newborns on the timeline of the history of 
organisms. Nonetheless, we might be in a sense of wonder about our own 
accomplishments in this world, but we should be careful to study this storied timeline on 
which we barely register. If we focus merely on ourselves, we will miss the wonder and 
excitement of nature, the miraculous adaptations organisms that have evolved over time 
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in order to overcome predators, and the storied struggle for life that has continuously 
encumbered species large and small. If we are curious about other life around us, we just 
might see that other animals deserve our wonder and our admiration—as all types of life 
have a story to tell. Rolston adds: 
Organisms have their own standards, fit into their niche though they must. They 
promote their own realization at the same time that they track an environment. 
They have a technique, a know-how. Every organism has a good-of-its-kind; it 
defends its own kind as a good kind… In organisms, the distinction between 
having a good-of-its-kind and being a good kind vanishes. To this extent, 
everything with a good-of-its-kind is a good kind and thereby has value (1988, 
101). 
 
The suggestion above is that the predator-prey relationship is a part of nature that 
is not problematic in nature; in fact, it is essential for its own evolution. A mountain lion 
is responsible for the fleetness of deer, and deer, in turn, are responsible for the stealth of 
the mountain lion (Byers, 1992, 34). No doubt, the relationship between predator and 
prey is an unspeakably tense one, but in another way, the two, through acts of constant 
conflict, help each other to coevolve.  
We might also wonder at the natural beauty of animals—the hypnotic black and 
white stripes of a zebra or the delicately striking patterns on a butterfly’s wing. Not only 
are we aesthetically pleased with many of nature’s organisms, we are engrossed by the 
power of evolution and the intricate capabilities it has endowed these creatures.  
A sense of wonder not only allows us to value the natural world, it also opens a 
door for us to learn about it. Whereas wonder is a feeling, learning about and coming to 
an understanding of nature is another level of appreciation and admiration for the 
environment. For example, natural structures, such as the Grand Canyon, can produce a 
sense of aesthetic wonder as some have evolved over millions of years through a steady 
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process of water and wind erosion. But one need not travel across the country to visit 
such a monumental structure to feel nature’s awe-inspiring presence. For me, lying in the 
grass in the shade of an oak tree is enough. The shade is comfortable, but connecting to 
the outside world and relaxing in its beauty provides me with an inner peace and can be a 
sanctuary.   
The final virtue, I believe, that is essential for an environmental virtue ethic is 
prudence. Prudence is concerned with how to act in particular situations rather than 
theoretical ones. A highly practical virtue, prudence determines actions by employing 
careful conduct and informed planning and is sometimes referred to as practical wisdom. 
Experience is key for prudent actions. Insofar as prudence is the act of making wise 
decisions, it follows that without this virtue the others are likely unattainable. For without 
prudence, we could not properly decide if our actions are for the right reasons and 
directed toward the right people and at the correct time.  
Prudence requires a sense of open-mindedness necessary for understanding 
precisely why an act might be virtuous. For instance, a donation of money to someone 
who neither needs it nor asks for it is likely a donation that is unwise. This action, while 
some might consider it to be kind or one of charity, is actually neither. Not only is the act 
profligate, it is parochial in that it fails to correctly see that the gift is unnecessary, at best, 
and unwanted, at worst. This virtue of practical wisdom directs our actions toward the 
mean and makes them virtuous. Without it, we have no virtue. Without it, we are like 
blindfolded archers attempting to hit our targets—we might be fortunate a time or two 
and hit the bullseye, but this would be a result of chance and not, as Aristotle says, by 
“complete perfection through habit” (Nicomachean Ethics II.1.1103a26-27).  
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 Concerning the land ethic, an excessively holistic outlook, such as one held by 
Callicott, undervalues the individual while an excessively individualistic viewpoint 
undervalues the community. Prudence can help us find a balanced holism and explains 
why we must not undervalue either the individual or the community. Prudence, in other 
words, demonstrates that valuing only the community, as Callicott’s precept suggests, 
means we naively conform to the group. We lose our individual worth as a result by 
following the crowd. On the other hand, valuing only the individual is egoistic and is 
subsequently inconsistent with the development of many virtues, including compassion, 
generosity and kindness.   
To put in perspective one example of an action requiring environmental prudence, 
consider a lightning strike that sparks a wildfire. This might not be the emergency it 
seems; in fact, firefighters and wildfire managers might value the fire as something 
necessary for the health of the local environment. They know that in the wild not all fires 
are created equally—some need suppression, some need to burn. Fires that are allowed to 
burn allow for the eating away of old material, rejuvenates the wilderness and acts as a 
connective thread in nature’s cycle of life.  
From the general perspective of human nature, fire is seen as threatening, 
destructive, even lethal. For Mother Nature, fire is life-affirming and paves a new path 
for growth of ecosystems. But only an experienced agent could determine when the time 
is right to let a wildfire go unchecked. As no two fires are the same, no decisions can be 
made with a rulebook—it takes prudence to know how to act, when to act, for what 
reason and why. This is a crucial difference between an environmental virtue ethic and an 
ethic based on deontology: virtue requires prudence to understand action, but deontology 
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is more like an ethics-by-rulebook and so does not require the virtue of prudence. 
Advocates of Callicott’s land ethic, consequently, are not required to truly understand 
their actions—even if they are as extreme as fascism—because they only need to know 
what the action is as it is stated by the principle precept. Someone using prudence, 
however, would not engage in such an extreme action.    
Individuals need environmental prudence as well if they are to act virtuously. 
Routinely we face many decisions today that reflect our individual values toward nature. 
From the cars we drive to the food we eat and even the manner in which we treat our 
local environment, our choices say a lot about how we value the natural world. 
Nevertheless, we still must make individual choices that follow our own paths of reason 
and our own practical wisdom. For instance, my actions to show respect to the natural 
world—the car I drive, the food I eat, the overall lifestyle I choose, etc.—very well could 
be quite different from everyone else’s. Some might not be able to play part in protecting 
the environment, for as Keown says, it is sensible to focus on establishing order first in 
our own house and then turn to environmental causes. Indeed, prudence not only instructs 
us to understand that some might not be ready to help the environment, it directs us to be 
understanding that people can be different from us. 
Gentleness and caring might be other virtues essential to an environmental ethic. 
In “The Land Ethic,” Leopold spoke of the need for cooperation, yet he also suggested 
that our ethical relationship to the land would fail unless we felt love and respect for land 
and cherished its value in its own right (1949, 223). The biggest challenge to the land 
ethic, he said, was that it wasn’t embraced by the educational and economic systems. 
Worse yet, he feared the two systems were losing ground in the hope of engaging with 
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and embracing the land. Leopold feared what he envisioned—that we are evolving to 
have no true relation to the environment around us, that we relate to it simply as a “space 
between cities on which crops grow” (224). The land, in brief, bores us, and it is 
something we have outgrown. 
In 1949, Leopold’s world must have looked quite different from today’s. The 
environmental challenges we currently face tower over those of Leopold’s time. A felt 
environmental virtue ethic that incorporates compassion, humility, wonder and prudence, 
in my opinion, is the best way to take “the third step” in the sequence to embrace the land 
ethic. If we want to value the land as we should, we need the mindset that is open to love, 
compassion and humility. If we are not of the virtuous kind, Leopold’s nightmarish 
vision in which we have outgrown, are bored by and have no relation to the natural 
world, I believe, will quickly fall upon us. The only antidote, I believe, to fight these 
poisons seeking to numb us of our feeling of the natural world are already naturally 
within us—the virtue of prudence acts as a guiding beacon to shine a path down this road 
less traveled, the virtue of wonder overcomes the deadening effects of boredom, and 
compassion and humility together show us there is a place—a wonderful place—for us 
within nature. 
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